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Abstract
Widowhood and retirement are likely to change the economic environment of
elderly households. While retirement primarily changes income and expenditure
patterns, widowhood fundamentally changes the structure of the household. Beside
high non-monetary cost of losing the partner, resources are no longer shared and
economies of scale arising from joint consumption are lost. This paper applies the
Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) collective household model to expenditure data on
elderly households in Switzerland. The findings suggest that between 40 and 50%
of household resources are assigned to wives and both spouses save approximately
25% on expenditures due to economies of scale in consumption. Widowers tend to
have higher wealth than widows. Estimates of indifference scales, however, indicate
that the financial loss related to widowhood is larger for men than for women.
Moreover, ignoring within household inequality, as implicitly done by traditional
equivalence scales, underestimates total inequality among individuals.
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ipants at the University of Bern for helpful suggestions and comments. All errors are my own. Financial
support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant 100018-135379) is gratefully acknowledged.
∗∗University of Bern, Department of Economics, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland,
email: daniel.burkhard@vwi.unibe.ch.
1 Introduction
The elderly face specific economic conditions because they are at the age of transition to
retirement. This is likely to change the economic environment of households and thereby
the behavior of its members. In addition, elderly people eventually become widow or
widower. Beside of high non-monetary costs, widowhood entails economic costs because
income and expenditure patterns are altered by changes in the size of the household.
Opportunities for economies of scale in joint consumption are lost and resources are no
longer shared between household members.1
This paper contributes to the literature on the standard of living of elderly people
and the impacts of retirement and widowhood using the collective household model pro-
posed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008). Estimation of the model parameters is based on
consumption data provided by the Swiss Household Budget Survey.
Traditional models of household behavior treat households as single decision makers
that maximize household utility subject to some household budget constraint. This sim-
plifies the analysis since standard results of consumer theory can be applied to decisions
like the consumption choices of the household. Furthermore, it does not matter who
earns which fraction of income. Since only total income is relevant, this approach is re-
ferred to as the income pooling hypothesis.2 For one-person households, the link of this
unitary model to consumer theory is quite natural. Maximizing household utility can be
viewed as maximizing the utility function of the consumer subject to her or his budget
constraint given by household income that is entirely at the single consumer’s disposal.
For multi-person households, however, Browning and Chiappori (1998) show that the uni-
tary model requires additional strong restrictions, which they reject in the empirical part
of their paper. In particular, Browning and Chiappori (1998) find evidence against the
income pooling hypothesis, meaning that bargaining power matters and income shares
have an impact on the composition of goods purchased by the household. Numerous
additional articles reject income pooling, examples thereof are Schultz (1990), Thomas
(1990), Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et al. (1994), Lundberg et al. (1997), and
Bütikofer et al. (2009).
Increasing criticism of unitary models has led to the development of collective house-
holds models initiated by the work of Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori (1992). Such
models account for a possibly unequal distribution of resources among household mem-
bers, each of whom has their own preferences. Typically, these models only assume
1For households of younger couples, the role of children is also important. In a recent paper, Dunbar
et al. (2013) extend collective household models to children. An earlier application of a collective model
to children was proposed by Donni and Bargain (2011).
2See, e.g., Chiappori (1992, p. 464).
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that household decisions are Pareto efficient.3 More recent collective household models,
e.g., Browning et al. (2013) and Dunbar et al. (2013), take into account economies of
scale in consumption in addition to heterogeneous preferences. Economies of scale arise
when goods are jointly consumed by wives and husbands. An example hereof is a couple
that travels together by car since gasoline use is only weakly affected by the number of
passengers.
This paper addresses the following questions: How are resources allocated to wives
and husbands in elderly couples? How large are economies of scale of living together and
do they change with retirement? How large are indifference scales, i.e., the fraction of
couple-household expenditures individuals living alone need to reach the same indifference
curve? Resource shares, scales economies and indifference scales of elderly couples are
estimated using the methodology proposed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008). Estimation
of the model is based on expenditure data on elderly households from the Swiss Household
Budget Survey. The sharing rule is identified by comparing data between singles and
couples, which is a common strategy in the literature on collective household models.4
The main results indicate that the share of resources that is allocated to the wife is for
most couples in the range between 40 and 50%. Scale economy estimates and indifference
scale estimates indicate that both spouses save 25% on expenditures due to jointness
of consumption and that approximately 60% of couple household resources are needed
by widows or widowers to maintain the same standard of living. Mean expenditures of
widowers are 16% higher than those of widows. However, the comparison to expenditures
of couples adjusted to the level of individuals by indifference scales shows that the loss
related to widowhood is higher for men than for women. This is mainly due to the result
that more than half of household resources are assigned to husbands. Inequality measures
based on adjusted expenditures show that traditional equivalence scales underestimate
total inequality among individuals by approximately 13%.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate a Lewbel and Pendakur (2008)
type model using expenditure data on Swiss households. Specifically for elderly house-
holds in Switzerland, it is the first application of a collective model. Applications of
collective household models for other age groups include Bütikofer et al. (2009) and
Bütikofer and Gerfin (forthcoming). Switzerland represents an interesting case because
the percentage of the elderly population is continuously increasing, which is the case for
most developed countries.5 The focus on standards of living of elderly people is appeal-
ing because of changing economic conditions at the transition from the labor force to
3There are articles that do not assume Pareto efficient household decisions, see Cherchye et al. (2011)
for a recent example.
4Other strategies exists. For a general discussion, see Cherchye et al. (2013).
5See, e.g., OECD data at http://data.oecd.org/pop/elderly-population.htm (accessed November 2014).
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retirement.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model in detail and
discusses issues of identification. The data used for estimation is described in section 3.
Section 4 shows the empirical implementation of the model. The subsequent section 5
presents the main results, related sensitivity checks, and provides an analysis of economic
well-being and consumption inequality. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
This paper applies the model proposed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) to elderly house-
holds at the age of transition from the labor force to retirement. Their approach allows to
estimate how household resources are divided between wives and husbands and to iden-
tify the returns to scale from joint consumption. The Lewbel and Pendakur (LP) model
is related to the approach by Browning et al. (2013), which is less restrictive but comes
at the cost of requiring data on price variation.6 Since data on prices are not available,
this paper sticks to the LP model.
The LP model is a collective household model. Such models do not consider house-
holds as a single decision maker. Instead, “the household is characterized as a collection
of individuals, each of whom has a well defined objective function, and who interact to
generate household level decisions” (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2008, p. 350).
2.1 Single Households Engel Curves
Before dealing with the process of intra-household division of resources, consider the
consumption decisions of single women and single men. Singles are the only decision
maker within their household, therefore their optimal choice of the bundle of goods is the
optimal choice of the household. This simplifies the analysis of consumption patterns,
since the entire household wealth is at their own disposal and there are no economies of
scale in consumption which are potentially arising in multi-person households.
Following the LP model, let ωkj (p, x, zj) denote the budget share demand function
for good k of person j with observable characteristics zj and log total expenditures x.
Person j faces a vector of market prices p =
[
p1, ..., pK
]′
and decides optimally to spend
the fraction ωkj (p, x, zj) of total expenditures (e
x) on good k, for k = 1, ..., K. Since
data on prices are not observed, it is not feasible to exploit any price variation and p
is restricted to a vector of constants. Similar to LP and Bütikofer et al. (2011), budget
shares (Engel curves) are specified as a rank three demand system that is quadratic in log
6Identification of the Browning et al. (2013) model does not require assumption 4 that is imposed in
section 2.2.
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total expenditures. Banks et al. (1997) show that this specification provides a sufficiently
general approximation to Engel curves. Person j is either a woman (j = f) or a man
(j = m). The quadratic form for each good k yields a system of K budget-share equations
for each type j:
ωkf (x, zf ) = a
k0
f + a
k
f
′
zf + (x− e′fzf )bkf + (x− e′fzf )2ckf + εkf (1)
ωkm(x, zm) = a
k0
m + a
k
m
′
zm + (x− e′mzm)bkm + (x− e′mzm)2ckm + εkm. (2)
Parameters to be estimated are ak0j , a
k
j , b
k
j , c
k
j , ej, where letters in bold mark column
vectors. The coefficients bkj by itself would only allow for a linear relation between log
expenditures x and budget shares ωkj . The inclusion of c
k
j captures Engel curvature, which
Banks et al. (1997) found to be of particular importance. Parameter vectors akj
′
and e′j
permit Engel curves to depend on individual control variables that are denoted by zf and
zm respectively. The variables ε
k
j denote error terms.
2.2 Resource Shares, Economies of Scale and Indifference Scales
In the LP model, each household member j determines the demand for consumption
goods by maximizing her or his own utility function. Person j’s budget constraint in this
maximization problem is given by the share ηj ∈ (0, 1) of total household expenditures
ex that is under control of person j, where
∑
j ηj = 1. In logs, personal expenditures
of j cannot exceed ln(ηje
x) = (ln ηj + x). The specifications chosen for estimation will
allow ηj to depend on a vector z including characteristics of the wife (zf ), of the husband
(zm) as well as distribution factors (zh) that are relevant on the household level. This
will formally be indicated by the expression ηj(z). One can think of ηj as a measure of
bargaining power.
The model allows for economies of scale in consumption. That is, some goods con-
sumed by the wife and the husband in a couple household are in total cheaper than
the sum of expenditures of two single households who also buy that good. The couple
household saves money due to jointness of consumption. In the example of sharing a car,
the couple saves money when wife and husband travel together. They nearly need half
as much gasoline compared to two singles, each of them traveling in their own car. Of
course, car usage does not have to be fully public, i.e., members of couple households do
not always travel together, sometimes they travel alone.
For goods k that are not purely private, jointness of consumption leads to shadow
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prices pks faced by individuals living in couple households that are lower than market
prices pk, which are relevant for singles. Cost savings for household member j arising
from joint consumption are incorporated in the model as illustrated by assumption 1.
Assumption 1. For j = f and j = m, there exists a function Dj(zj) measuring the cost
savings resulting from economies of scale such that it holds for an indirect utility function
Vj
Vj(ps, x) = Vj
(
p, x− lnDj(zj)
)
where ps ≤ p.
Assumption 1 states that the utility a person j can achieve when facing shadow prices
ps and total (log) expenditures x is the same as utility under market prices p but having
expenditures upscaled by some function Dj(zj) ∈ (0, 1]. Dj(zj) is an aggregate over
goods measure of cost savings that equals 1 when there are no economies of scale, and
Dj(zj) is < 1 when some goods are shared. Note that assumption 1 restricts Dj(zj) to
be independent of log expenditures x.7 As indicated by the dependence on zj, economies
of scale are allowed to vary by observable individual characteristics.
To compare singles with wives and husbands living in couple households, not only
economies of scale are relevant. Utility comparisons on the individual level need to con-
sider ηj(z), the sharing rule assigning resources to wives and husbands, and they involve
further assumptions. Assumption 2 relates indifference curves of singles to members of
couple households.
Assumption 2. For j = f and j = m, individual j’s indifference curves over goods
remain the same whether living as a member of a couple household or as a single.
Assumption 2 is potentially restrictive, because preferences of wives (husbands) may
differ from single women (men), but it is crucial for identification of the LP model. One
way to deal with it is to consider only specific types of singles. This approach is applied
for the estimates presented in section 5 and explained in further detail in section 2.4.
Two additional assumptions on household behavior are imposed to relate budget share
functions of single and couple households.
Assumption 3. Household decision are Pareto efficient.
Assumption 4. Resource shares ηj are independent of base expenditures x.
7For a discussion on restrictiveness and testability of the independence assumption, see Lewbel and
Pendakur (2008, p. 353).
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Assumptions 3 ensures that households do not waste resources. Assumption 4 is
essential to derive an expression for budget shares of couple households. However, the
latter can potentially be mitigated, the model in general allows for dependence of resource
shares on measures of household wealth other than total expenditures, e.g., household
income, or education levels. Given these assumptions, LP show that indifference scales
allow us to compare the utility of someone living alone to the utility that the same
individual would achieve when living in a couple household.
Definition 1. The indifference scale Ij(z) puts individual j living alone on the same
indifference curve as she or he would attain living in a couple household.
Vj(p, x− ln Ij(z)) = Vj(ps, ln ηj(z) + x)
The left-hand side of the equation denotes the utility of individual j living alone, the
right-hand side describes the utility level achieved by j when living in a couple household.
Indifference scales can be used for statements such as: Suppose person j lives in a couple
household. If that person would live alone, what fraction of total (couple) household
expenditures would be necessary to reach the same in difference curve?8 The number
that answers this question is (1/Ij(z)). LP show that the indifference scale is given by
the scale economy parameter divided by the measure of resource shares. That is,
Ij(z) =
Dj(zj)
ηj(z)
. (3)
An appealing property of the LP setup is that indifference scales are invariant to how
utility is cardinalized, which is not the case for traditional equivalence scales.9
2.3 Couple Households Engel Curves
Based on resource shares and indifference scales as defined in section 2.2, LP show that
the budget share demand functions of couple households, denoted by ωkh(x, z), are
ωkh(x, z) =
∑
j
ηj(z)
[
ψkj (zj) + ω
k
j
(
x− ln Ij(z), zj
)]
(4)
for a fixed price regime and some good k. ψkj (zj) = (∂ lnDj(zj)/∂ ln pk), the elasticity
of Dj(zj) with respect to the price of good k, is constant when prices are invariant.
Equation 4 shows that the couple household budget shares are essentially a weighted
sum of individual budget shares, adjusted by some constant Ψk =
∑
j ηj(z)ψ
k
j (zj). The
8This is the question we should ask for people that become widow or widower.
9See Lewbel and Pendakur (2008, p. 352) for the proof.
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weights are given by the resource shares ηj(z). Household total expenditures x downscaled
by the indifference scale Ij(z) lead to the expenditure level that is relevant for the choice
of (individual) budget shares of household member j. It is useful to drop index j from
the resource share parameter. Since only couples of wives and husbands are considered,
let η(z) denote the resource share of the wife. Consequently, the share of the husband is
(1− η(z)). Combining equation 4 with equations 1 and 2 yields a system of K equations
to be estimated for couple households:
ωkh = η(z)
[
ak0f + a
k
f
′
zf +
(
x− ln If (z)− e′fzf
)
bkf
+
(
x− ln If (z)− e′fzf
)2
ckf + ψ
k
f (zf )
]
+
(
1− η(z)
)[
ak0m + a
k
m
′
zm +
(
x− ln Im(z)− e′mzm
)
bkm
+
(
x− ln Im(z)− e′mzm
)2
ckm + ψ
k
m(zm)
]
+ εkh.
(5)
It remains to parametrize how indifference scales Ij, resource shares η and price elas-
ticities ψkj are allowed to vary by observable characteristics z. This component of the
model is clarified in section 4.1.
2.4 Identification
The model consisting of equations 1, 2 and 5 is identified given expenditure data for
couple households, single women and single men. Assumption 2 allows to express couple
budget shares as a function of individual budget shares, as shown in equation 4. When
expenditure data for couples and women as well as men living alone is observed, budget
shares ωkh, ω
k
f and ω
k
m are identified for each k. Identification of resource shares η and
indifference scales Ij requires Engel curves that are nonlinear and different across goods
as well as across people, i.e., not the same for females and males.10 Suppose in contrary
ωkf and ω
k
m were equivalent, then “weights” of the sum in equation 4 would not matter
and ηj would not be identified. Nonlinearity and variation across goods is required to
identify all bkj and c
k
j parameters. Linear functions instead would not identify c
k
j . When
everything else is known, the constant parameters Ψk, capturing the price elasticity of
Dj, are identified as well. For a more detailed and technical proof of identification in the
LP model, see Lewbel and Pendakur (2008, p. 353).
10We need the last condition to hold for at least as many goods as there are people in the household.
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Assumption 2 imposes that preferences of individuals need to be comparable whether
living as a member of a couple household or as a single. However, when comparing data
of all singles with members of couple households, this assumption could be violated due
to the fact that marriage is not randomly assigned. Therefore, the main results shown in
section 5.1 are estimated using data on couples, widows and widowers only. Widows and
widowers are singles that once decided to get married. Therefore, they are not likely to be
systematically different from people living in couple households, assuming that preference
changes related to widowhood are negligible.
3 Data
The model introduced in section 2 is estimated using data from the Swiss Household Bud-
get Survey (HBS), conducted by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Beside key individual
attributes, this dataset provides comprehensive expenditure data at the household level
for various goods and services.11 This study explores pooled cross-section data of the
years 2000 to 2005, adjusted for inflation, for one- and two-person households where the
sample is restricted to households consisting of members that are between 50 and 80 years
old. Individuals in this age bracket are of economic interest since they pass the transition
from the labor force to retirement. The sample consists of 3459 married couples, 1034
single woman and 316 single men. All singles live in one-person households and 823 of
them are widowed (669 widows and 154 widowers).
Individual control variables used for the estimation of the Engel curves are retirement
status, education and age of each household member. The retirement and education vari-
ables are dummies. The former is 1 for those that are retired (0 otherwise) and the latter
equals 1 for individuals with tertiary education (0 for lower education levels). For couple
households, an additional binary variable that indicates whether the wife or the husband
earns more is available. If the wife provides the larger fraction of household income, this
binary indicator equals 1, otherwise 0. Summary statistics of the demographic charac-
teristics are shown in table 1. On average, widows and widowers are older and more
often retired than singles and married couples. Single women tend to have relatively high
levels of education, while educational achievements of widows are lower but comparable
to wives in couple households. For men, education levels are the highest for married
husbands. For 7% of couple households, the wife earns more than her husband.12
11The HBS provides the data that is used to determine the basket of commodities listed in the Swiss
Consumer Price Index.
12The share is 12% for couples where the husband is retired but the wife is still working.
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Table 1: Mean characteristics (z vectors)
Widowed Widowed Single Single Married Married
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Retired 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.61 0.47 0.58
Education 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.27 0.07 0.31
Age 71.09 70.82 69.31 65.76 63.09 65.51
Wife earns more 0.07
Observations 669 154 1034 316 3459 3459
Note: Singles include widows and widowers.
Data source: Household Budget Survey (HBS).
Six expenditure categories are considered: food products and nonalcoholic beverages,
housing, housekeeping, transportation, entertainment and recreation and culture, and
telecommunication. They have been chosen for two reasons. First, these are goods and
services on which households can freely choose how much to spend. This would, for in-
stance, not be the case for health insurance premiums.13 Second, these are the ones for
which most households reported non-zero expenditures. Note that food and nonalcoholic
beverages denote products consumed at home. Housing contains the rent or mortgage
interest payment and energy cost of the principal residence. Housekeeping includes ordi-
nary household expenditures such as furniture, home textiles, home appliances, tools, or
decoration but excludes comestible goods. Transportation excludes car purchases because
these are large but infrequent expenditures that distort ordinary monthly expenditures.
The distribution of expenditures across household types is shown in table 2. Single
women assign two percentage points more of their expenditures to food products and
nonalcoholic beverages as well as to housing than single men. Single men, on the other
hand, spend five percentage points more on transportation than single women. These
differences are significant on the 5% level and they are of the same magnitude when
widows are compared to widowers. Even though the differences are small for budget
shares of other goods, the descriptive statistics reveal the importance of models allowing
for unequal preferences among members of multi-person households. Couples’ budget
shares related to housing are considerably lower than corresponding shares of one-person
households, the differences are in between seven and ten percentage points and they are
13Health insurance is compulsory in Switzerland.
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significant on the 1% level. Moreover, couples spend significantly more on food products
and nonalcoholic beverages. For other goods, the differences are small.
Table 2: Mean budget shares by household type
Widowed Widowed Single Single Married
Women Men Women Men Couples
Food Products and Nonalcoholic Beverages 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.26
Housing 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.37
Housekeeping 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Transportation 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.12
Entertainment, Recreation, Culture 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
Telecommunication 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Observations 669 154 1034 316 3459
Note: Singles include widows and widowers. Transportation excludes car purchases.
Data source: Household Budget Survey (HBS).
Table 3: Mean budget shares for couples by retirement status
Both Wife Husband Both
Working Retired Retired Retired
Food Products and Nonalcoholic Beverages 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.28
Housing 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.35
Housekeeping 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Transportation 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12
Entertainment, Recreation, Culture 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14
Telecommunication 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Observations 1283 247 634 1295
Note: Singles include widows and widowers. Transportation excludes car purchases.
Data source: Household Budget Survey (HBS).
Table 3 summarizes budget shares for married couples differentiated by retirement
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status. Expenditures related to home production as food products and nonalcoholic
beverages tend to receive slightly higher budget shares in households where at least one
member is retired. Budget shares allocated to housing are lower for retirees. Other goods
show little variation by retirement status.
4 Empirical Implementation
4.1 Parametrization
Parametric forms chosen for this paper follow, with an exception concerning the price
elasticities of Dj(zj), the specifications proposed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008). That
is, the resource share of the wife η(z), and consequently (1 − η(z)) for the husband, is
parametrized to be linear in individual and household characteristics.
η(z) = r′z = r0 + r
′
hzh + r
′
fzf + r
′
mzm (6)
The cost savings functions Dj(zj), resulting from economies of scale when living with
others, are specified to be log-linear in individual characteristics.
lnDf (zf ) = d0f + d
′
fzf (7)
lnDm(zm) = d0m + d
′
mzm (8)
Equation 3 shows that log indifference scales can be expressed as the difference of log
cost savings and log resource shares. With the parametrizations of equations 6, 7 and 8,
this yields parametric expressions for log indifference scales.
ln If (z) = lnDf (zf )− ln η(z)
= d0f + d
′
fzf − ln (r0 + r′hzh + r′fzf + r′mzm)
(9)
ln Im(z) = lnDm(zm)− ln (1− η(z))
= d0m + d
′
mzm − ln (1− r0 − r′hzh − r′fzf − r′mzm)
(10)
It remains to parametrize the elasticities of Dj(zj) with respect to prices of goods k,
denoted by ψkj (zj). In general, these parameters can be different for wives and husbands
(j = f,m) and depend on individual characteristics zj. In the HBS data, however, there
12
is limited variation to identify these parameters. The specification of this paper allows
these coefficients to differ by gender j, but not to depend on further covariates.
ψkf (zf ) = δ
k
f (11)
ψkm(zm) = δ
k
m (12)
The structure imposed by equations 11 and 12 is not considered to be particularly re-
strictive. An alternative approach, followed by Bütikofer et al. (2011), would be to omit
ψkj (zj). Results for this specification, which reduces the number of estimands, are re-
ported in section 5.4.2.
4.2 Estimation
The vectors of individual control variables, zf and zm, include retirement status, educa-
tion and age. Included in zh as a distribution factor is the binary variable indicating who
is the main contributor to household income. Engel curves are estimated for all goods
except telecommunication because budget shares sum to 1. In summary, this model for
3 types of households and five different goods leads to a system of 3 × 5 equations that
are jointly estimated by nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression. Similar to Lewbel
and Pendakur (2008), precision of the estimates is examined using asymptotic standard
errors. Joint estimation of a total of 92 parameters is inevitable since the model con-
tains parameter restrictions over budget share equations of different goods as well as over
household types.
5 Results
The model is estimated using normalized covariates such that a vector of zeros corre-
sponds to an individual that is not retired, has no tertiary education and is 60 years old.
For couples, the additional normalization that the husband is the main contributor to
household income is imposed. This normalization allows for a meaningful interpretation
of the intercepts as estimates for a well defined reference group.
5.1 Resource Shares and Scale Economies
This section shows the results for the resource share and economy of scale parameters.
Coefficients and corresponding standard errors are reported in table 4. The estimates of
all Engel curve parameters are in the appendix (table 10).
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For couples where the husband earns more than his wife, where both spouses are still
in the labor force, have no tertiary education and are 60 years old, the wife is estimated
to receive the fraction η = 0.462 with a standard error (SE) of 0.056, which is 46.2% of
household resources. The point estimate indicates that slightly less than half of household
resources are allocated to the wife. Note, however, that equal shares of 50% are inside the
95% confidence interval. When the wife earns more, her share is estimated to significantly
increase by 2 percentage points. This leads to a point estimate that is very close to fifty-
fifty shares. Concerning age effects, the share of the wife is estimated to be lower for older
couples. Increasing the age of both spouses by 5 years significantly reduces the fraction
assigned to the wife by 3.7 percentage points (SE: 1.3 percentage points). Education and
retirement status have small and insignificant effects on how resources are divided within
couples. Note that the education level of wives and husbands is highly correlated within
households. For 73% of all couples in the data, the binary education variable is the same
for both spouses.
Table 4: Sharing rule and scale economy parameter estimates
Sharing rule Wife scale economy Husband scale economy
η(z) lnDf (zf ) lnDm(zm)
Est Std Err Est Std Err Est Std Err
Intercept 0.462*** 0.056 -0.214 0.135 -0.217 0.172
Wife earns more 0.020* 0.011
Wife retired -0.009 0.010 -0.139 0.092
Husband retired 0.016 0.014 -0.060 0.109
Education wife 0.009 0.013 -0.013 0.113
Education husband 0.009 0.010 0.100 0.076
Age wife -0.001 0.001 -0.012* 0.007
Age husband -0.006*** 0.002 -0.023** 0.009
Number of observations: 4282. Number of parameters in the model: 92.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Figure 1 shows the histogram of predicted female resource shares η(z). These pre-
dictions have an average of 43.5%. For 63% of all couples, resource shares of wives are
estimated to lie in the relatively narrow interval between 40% and 50%.14 The estimates
14All female resource shares are predicted to lie in the interval between 30% and 55%.
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are comparable to the results of Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) who find slightly lower
shares between 36 and 46%. Specifically for elderly households, diverging results are re-
ported in the literature. Bütikofer et al. (2011) find that approximately 33% are allocated
to the wife, Cherchye et al. (2012) estimate shares in the order of 63%. An application
using Swiss data is Bütikofer and Gerfin (forthcoming).15 Their results indicate that
almost 50% are allocated to wives in non-elderly households.
Figure 1: Histogram of estimated female resource shares η(z)
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Economies of scale arising from joint consumption reduce the expenditures necessary
to reach some level of utility. Wives living in couple households are estimated to face the
fraction Df = exp (−.214) = 80.7% of the cost when they live alone due to widowhood.16
Husbands are estimated to face 80.5% of the cost. Note, however, that ln(Df ) and ln(Dm)
are not precisely estimated with standard errors of 0.135 and 0.172 respectively. The cost
savings of wives and husbands significantly increase when they get older. Retirement
tends to augment scale economies as well. This is plausible because former workers are
likely to spend considerably more time at home when they retire. A wife who is 65 years
old and retired is estimated to face 66.2% of the cost of a widow,17 which is clearly less
than the estimate before retirement. The estimate for a husband who is 65 and retired
is 67.6%. Higher education does not have a large impact on the economies of scale of
wives. For husbands, economies of scale are estimated to be lower for those with higher
15Bütikofer and Gerfin (forthcoming) estimate a collective model based on satisfaction data.
16This is the estimate for the reference group with covariates normalized to zero.
17The calculation of Df for illustration: 0.662 = exp (−.214− .139− 5× .012)
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education. When integrated over the covariate distribution, the average estimates are
73.5% for Df and 72.0% for Dm.
The parameters of the sharing rule are more precisely estimated than those consti-
tuting the scale economies. This pattern also occurs in alternative specifications and is
similar to the standard errors reported in the application of Lewbel and Pendakur (2008).
The results for resource shares and economies of scale allow us to construct estimates of
indifference scales. For the reference group (couples where both spouses are 60 years old,
not retired, do not have higher education and where the husband is the main contributor
to household income), the point estimates of the indifference scales are If = 1.746 and
Im = 1.497 with standard errors of 0.162 for If and 0.184 for Im. These results indicate
that wives need 57.3% (= 1/1.746) of total couple households resources to maintain the
same standard of living when becoming a widow. Husbands are estimated to need 66.8%.
Especially for wives, other authors find somewhat larger scales. Browning et al. (2013),
Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), and Bütikofer and Gerfin (forthcoming) report values of
approximately 70%. For the present paper, however, the point estimate of the indifference
scale for women who are retired and 65 years old is 1.525, assuming their husbands are
also 65 years old and retired. Hence, the fraction of (former) couple household resources a
widow needs to maintain the same standard of living increases to 65.6%, mainly because
of larger returns to scale in consumption after retirement.
5.2 Economic Well-Being among Widows and Widowers
Based on the parameter estimates in section 5.1, indifference scales can be constructed
for each person in the sample separately. These scales depend on individual as well as
household characteristics and allow to compare utility levels of members of couple house-
holds to individuals living alone, in this case to widows and widowers. This comparison
helps to investigate the economic (monetary) consequences of widowhood. Non-monetary
costs of losing the spouse are not part of the analysis. The sample median inverse indif-
ference scale for wives in couple households (1/If ) is 59.0% of household resources, the
median for husbands is 79.9%.18 Note that for one-person households, e.g., widows and
widowers, the scale is 100% by construction. Female indifference scales are distributed in
a small interval. Male indifference scales have a larger variance. The reason is that there
is considerable variation in the estimates of Dm that summarize economies of scales for
husbands while resource shares (η) and female scale economies (Df ) are distributed in
small intervals.
Table 5 shows the mean and three quartiles of the expenditure distribution for widows,
18The median of female resource shares (η) is 43.9%. The medians of the cost savings functions are
0.733 for Df and 0.700 for Dm.
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widowers and couple households (not yet adjusted by any scale). Only expenditures on
goods and services used for estimation of the model are included in the numbers shown in
the table.19 Table 6 compares these quantities to the corresponding means and quantiles
of couple households, adjusted by an equivalence scale as well as indifference scales.
The equivalence scale is the modified OECD equivalence scales that divides household
level variables by 1.5. The downscaling is the same for husbands and wives and thereby
imposes the assumption of equal intra-household division of resources. Indifference scales,
however, are different for women and men.
Table 5: Expenditures by household type
Mean Percentiles
25% 50% 75%
Widows 2000.5 1459.2 1815.4 2285.2
Widowers 2328.7 1414.1 2097.8 2816.6
Couples 3095.7 2141.7 2828.4 3727.8
Measured in Swiss Francs per month,
adjusted to the price level of the year 2000.
The summary statistics of table 5 show that widowers are often in a better financial
situation than widows and are therefore able to spend more on consumption. Their mean
expenditures as well as the median and higher percentiles are larger than for widows.
Higher expenditures are affordable for widowers because their salary or pension tends
to be larger. Nevertheless, low quantiles of the expenditure distribution of widowers are
very similar to the ones of widows. Total expenditures of couples are considerably higher
compared to one-person households.
Couple households expenditures adjusted by the OECD equivalence scale are in the
range of expenditure levels of widowers and widows (table 6). In particular, mean expen-
ditures indicate that individuals in couples are slightly better off than widows but worse
off than widowers. While average monthly expenditures of widows are 3.1% lower, those
of widowers are 12.8% higher.
Indifference scales, however, show that economies of scale in consumption and the
intra-household bargaining process are particularly beneficial for husbands. Therefore
a husband needs relatively high expenditures to maintain the same standard of living
19This is because the indifference scales are estimated based on these goods and services.
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when his wife dies. Compared to the means of actual expenditures reported by widows
and widowers, only men suffer a financial loss when becoming widower. While women
are estimated to need 1842 Francs per month to maintain the same standard of living,
mean expenditures of widows are roughly 160 Francs higher. Men are estimated to need
2466 Francs. Actual expenditures of widowers are, however, 137 Francs lower. That is,
widowers are estimated to lose 5.6%, while widows in fact have 8.6% higher expenditures
at their disposal.
Table 6: Expenditures assigned to individuals in couple households
Mean Percentiles
25% 50% 75%
OECD equivalence scale
Individuals in couples 2063.8 1427.8 1885.6 2485.2
Indifference scales
Women in couples 1842.1 1265.0 1675.0 2231.9
Men in couples 2465.7 1696.7 2253.1 2946.2
Measured in Swiss Francs per month, adjusted to the price
level of the year 2000. The (modified) OECD equivalence
scale divides expenditures of couple households by 1.5.
In summary, while widowers are often financially better off than widows, their loss
compared to the situation living in couple households is larger. First, this is because
slightly more than half of household resources are allocated to husbands. Second, their
returns to scale in consumption seem, although not very precisely estimated, to be quite
large.
5.3 Consumption Inequality
This section provides an analysis of inequality between households of different types. In
this regard, inequality measures are computed for couple households, widows and wid-
owers. The first three rows of table 7 show the commonly used Theil and Gini indices
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for these types of households. The numbers indicate that consumption inequality among
widows is similar to inequality among couples. Inequality among widowers is slightly
higher. The indices for couple households are based on total household expenditures.
Using total household expenditures entails the assumption of no within-household in-
equality, which is implicitly done by equivalence scales. Therefore, couples’ expenditures
adjusted to the individual level by any equivalence scale does not change the inequality
measures (row four of table 7).
In contrast, indifference scales consider inequality among couple households taking
into account the unequal distribution of resources between wives and husbands. The bot-
tom row of table 7 shows that both indices increase when couples expenditures are trans-
formed by individual-specific indifference scales. This indicates that traditional equiva-
lence scales tend to underestimate individual level inequality because they disregard this
potential second factor arising from within-household inequality. Based on indifference
scales, the additively decomposable Theil index is 0.104, while it is 0.092 when differ-
ences between wives and husbands are ignored. These numbers indicate that 11.5% of
total inequality among women and men living in couple households arises from within
household inequality. Other authors report even higher proportions, e.g., Bütikofer and
Gerfin (forthcoming) find 16% and Lise and Seitz (2011) estimate that 25% is due to
within household inequality.
Table 7: Consumption inequality
Theil index Gini index
Widows 0.090 0.229
Widowers 0.119 0.268
Couples 0.092 0.238
Equivalence scale
Individuals in couples 0.092 0.238
Indifference scales
Individuals in couples 0.104 0.251
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5.4 Robustness Checks
This section provides robustness checks for the results of section 5.1. First, the identical
model is estimated using additional data on all singles (section 5.4.1). Second, the price
elasticity parameters ψkj (zj) are excluded from couples’ budget share equations (section
5.4.2).
5.4.1 Estimates based on data for Widows, Widowers, Singles and Couples
Table 8 shows the estimates of the sharing rule and scale economy parameters for an
alternative, extended data set using information on singles in addition to widows, wid-
owers and couples. This adds 528 observations to the data, but makes assumption 2 less
credible because preferences over goods are assumed to be equal for singles and married
individuals. That is, we use data on single women (men) to identify preferences of wives
(husbands).
Table 8: Estimates based on data for widows, widowers, singles, and couples
Sharing rule Wife scale economy Husband scale economy
η(z) lnDf (zf ) lnDm(zm)
Est Std Err Est Std Err Est Std Err
Intercept 0.403*** 0.061 -0.038 0.125 -0.413*** 0.161
Wife earns more 0.022 0.020
Wife retired -0.008 0.011 -0.055 0.077
Husband retired -0.025 0.024 -0.302*** 0.092
Education wife 0.023 0.022 -0.003 0.101
Education husband -0.003 0.011 -0.027 0.062
Age wife -0.001 0.001 -0.009 0.006
Age husband -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005
Number of observations: 4810. Number of parameters in the model: 92.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
The intercept of the female resource share is estimated to be somewhat lower (40.3%)
compared to the baseline model (46.2%) of section 5.1. This is, however, no major
difference since the 95% confidence intervals of both estimates overlap. The age variables,
which were estimated to increase the share of the husband, turn out to be insignificant.
20
Similar to the main model, retirement status and education are insignificant for the
sharing rule. Economies of scale for husbands are estimated to be larger than reported in
section 5.1, while those for wives are smaller. The returns to scale are, however, not very
precisely estimated; standard errors are similar to the baseline model and 95% confidence
intervals overlap for most of the coefficients. As in section 5.1, retirement is estimated
to increase scale economies which indicates that opportunities for joint consumption rise
when wife and husband drop out of the labor force.
5.4.2 The model without price elasticity parameters
The LP model involves estimation of many parameters. A reduction in the number
of coefficients, proposed by Bütikofer et al. (2011), is to omit ψkj (zj), the parameters
capturing the elasticities of Dj(zj) with respect to prices of goods k. For the present
paper, this approach reduces the number of parameters from 92 to 82 and potentially
increases efficiency. There are less parameters because the budget share equations for
couples simplify to equation 13:
ωkh = η(z)
[
ak0f + a
k
f
′
zf +
(
x− ln If (z)− e′fzf
)
bkf
+
(
x− ln If (z)− e′fzf
)2
ckf
]
+
(
1− η(z)
)[
ak0m + a
k
m
′
zm +
(
x− ln Im(z)− e′mzm
)
bkm
+
(
x− ln Im(z)− e′mzm
)2
ckm
]
+ εkh.
(13)
The results for this model are shown in table 9. For the reference group, the restricted
model yields a female resource share of 0.355. This estimate is 10.7 percentage points
lower than the coefficient found when price elasticities are included. While scale economies
of husbands are similar to the baseline model, the estimate for wives is considerably
different. Women in couples are now estimated to face 93.1% of the cost, which is clearly
more than the 80.7% that were found in the unrestricted model. Moreover, the impact
of covariates on resource shares and scale economies is not stable, e.g., the previously
positive effect of higher income of the wife on resource shares turns insignificant.
The restriction ψkj (zj) = 0, i.e., price elasticities of Dj(zj) are zero, is found to have
more impact on the results than including additional data on all singles in the unrestricted
model. In addition, the restriction did not make the estimation much more efficient. In
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line with these findings, the joint null hypothesis of price elasticities equal to zero in the
main model (section 5.1) is rejected on the 1% level.
Table 9: Estimates for the restricted model without price elasticity parameters
Sharing rule Wife scale economy Husband scale economy
η(z) lnDf (zf ) lnDm(zm)
Est Std Err Est Std Err Est Std Err
Intercept 0.355*** 0.045 -0.072 0.099 -0.231** 0.116
Wife earns more -0.008 0.019
Wife retired -0.004 0.017 -0.068 0.071
Husband retired 0.025 0.021 -0.156 0.099
Education wife 0.039 0.026 -0.176** 0.088
Education husband -0.044* 0.024 0.106 0.077
Age wife -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005
Age husband -0.015*** 0.002 0.029*** 0.007
Number of observations: 4282. Number of parameters in the model: 82.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
6 Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of the standards of living of elderly Swiss households
using a model that takes changes in consumption expenditures related to retirement and
widowhood into account. While retirement essentially impacts income and expenditure
patterns, widowhood alters the composition of a household. As the number of household
members declines from two to one, economies of scale arising from joint consumption in
couple households disappear. Moreover, resources are no longer shared. Identification and
estimation of the LP model applied in this paper is based on household-level expenditure
data for couples, widows and widowers. The latter are used to identify preferences of
individuals living in couples.
The main findings can be summarized as follows: wives control between 40 and 50%
of household resources and both partners save approximately 25% on expenditures due
to joint consumption of some goods. Retirement is estimated to increase these returns
to scale. Resource shares and scale economies are combined to indifference scales that
adjust couple households’ expenditures to the individual level. The findings suggest that
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the financial loss related to widowhood is larger for widowers than for widows. Moreover,
indifference scales are useful to examine measures of inequality. The estimates indicate
that about 12% of total inequality among women and men living in couple households
arises from within-household inequality.
There are limitations that cannot not be addressed with the model and available data.
First, the results are based on a static model. Any dynamic aspects, as for instance the
transition process to retirement, cannot be captured. Individuals are either observed as
being part of the labor force or as retirees. An important extension for future research
would therefore be to extend the model to capture dynamics in consumption expenditures
but also in retirement decisions. The LP model implicitly assumes that retirement is
exogenous. Although most individuals retire during the period of one or two years around
the ordinary retirement age, there is still some leeway in decision-making that is not
captured by the model. Second, there is no information concerning health status in the
data. However, it would be useful to investigate how parameters of interest like resource
shares vary by health status.20 Third, the HBS data does not include time-use data on
home production, e.g., cooking. As emphasized by Apps and Rees (1997), these activities
considerably contribute to overall consumption. Aside from these limitations, the present
paper provides a first step into the analysis of the financial consequences of widowhood
for elderly Swiss households.
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A Appendix
Table 10: Estimates of the 92 parameters of the main model
Est Std Err Est Std Err Est Std Err
am10 -0.106 0.645 af10 5.276 0.422 r0 0.462 0.056
am20 0.067 0.021 af20 -0.006 0.012 rh1 0.020 0.011
am30 -0.009 0.016 af30 -0.068 0.013 rm1 0.016 0.014
am40 -0.011 0.001 af40 -0.002 0.001 rm2 0.009 0.010
am50 -7.889 1.128 af50 -13.402 0.860 rm3 -0.006 0.002
am11 -0.062 0.020 af11 0.002 0.015 rf1 -0.009 0.010
am21 -0.052 0.015 af21 0.032 0.019 rf2 0.009 0.013
am31 0.008 0.002 af31 0.004 0.001 rf3 -0.001 0.001
am41 0.634 0.584 af41 3.367 0.412 dm0 -0.217 0.172
am51 -0.020 0.011 af51 0.001 0.007 dm1 -0.060 0.109
am12 -0.007 0.008 af12 -0.003 0.008 dm2 0.100 0.076
am22 0.005 0.001 af22 0.001 0.000 dm3 -0.023 0.009
am32 0.819 0.597 af32 2.410 0.413 df0 -0.214 0.135
am42 0.006 0.009 af42 0.002 0.007 df1 -0.139 0.092
am52 0.022 0.007 af52 0.013 0.008 df2 -0.013 0.113
am13 -0.001 0.001 af13 0.000 0.000 df3 -0.012 0.007
am23 6.936 0.774 af23 2.866 0.468 δm1 0.426 0.161
am33 0.006 0.011 af33 0.001 0.008 δm2 -0.327 0.136
am43 0.037 0.009 af43 0.035 0.009 δm3 -0.122 0.061
am53 -0.001 0.001 af53 -0.002 0.000 δm4 -0.036 0.032
bm1 0.245 0.171 bf1 -1.222 0.114 δm5 0.070 0.046
bm2 2.195 0.295 bf2 3.632 0.226 δf1 -0.465 0.205
bm3 -0.223 0.154 bf3 -0.942 0.112 δf2 0.275 0.166
bm4 -0.209 0.157 bf4 -0.638 0.113 δf3 0.191 0.084
bm5 -1.866 0.200 bf5 -0.736 0.128 δf4 0.069 0.046
cm1 -0.026 0.011 cf1 0.073 0.008 δf5 -0.084 0.062
cm2 -0.144 0.019 cf2 -0.237 0.015
cm3 0.019 0.010 cf3 0.067 0.008
cm4 0.015 0.010 cf4 0.044 0.008
cm5 0.127 0.013 cf5 0.050 0.009
em1 -0.297 0.115 ef1 0.136 0.060
em2 -0.023 0.080 ef2 0.472 0.056
em3 0.041 0.007 ef3 0.006 0.004
Note: Indices running from 1 to 5 denote goods k in the order: Food Products and
Nonalcoholic Beverages, Housing, Housekeeping, Transportation, Entertainment.
Indices running from 1 to 3 denote covariate effects in the order: retirement,
education, age.
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